Evidence by Davis, Robin Jean & Palmer, Louis J., Jr.
Volume 102 
Issue 5 Issue 5, A Tribute to Thomas E. 
McHugh: An Encyclopedia of Legal Principles 
From His Opinions as a Justice of the West 




Robin Jean Davis 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
Louis J. Palmer Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robin J. Davis & Louis J. Palmer Jr., Evidence, 102 W. Va. L. Rev. (2002). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol102/iss5/6 
This A Tribute to Thomas E. McHugh: An Encyclopedia of Legal Principles From His Opinions as a Justice of the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at 
The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized 
editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
A TRIBUTE TO THOMAS E. McHUGH
"Chief' Justice McHugh.
II. EVIDENCE
A. Evidence of Flight by Defendant
In State v. Payne,5 Justice McHugh confronted the issue of introducing
evidence that a criminal defendant fled the scene of the crime. Justice McHugh
wrote:
In certain circumstances evidence of the flight of the defendant
will be admissible in a criminal trial as evidence of the
defendant's guilty conscience or knowledge. Prior to admitting
such evidence, however, the trial judge, upon request by either the
State or the defendant, should hold an in camera hearing to
determine whether the probative value of such evidence outweighs
its possible prejudicial effect.6
B. Incriminating Evidence Not Associated with Defendant
Justice McHugh held in State v. Rector?
It is reversible error for a trial judge to admit into evidence in a
criminal trial of a defendant charged with a marihuana violation[,]
drug paraphernalia and marihuana belonging to a state witness
when such drug paraphernalia and marihuana have not been
associated with the defendant and have no probative value relating
to the guilt of the defendant.8
C. Testimony of Accomplice
Justice McHugh addressed the issue of permitting an accomplice to testify
against a defendant in State v. Caudill.9 The court held that
[i]n a criminal trial an accomplice may testify as a witness on
behalf of the State to having entered a plea of guilty to the crime
charged against a defendant where such testimony is not for the
purpose of proving the guilt of the defendant and is relevant to the
issue of the witness-accomplice's credibility. The failure by a trial
5 280 S.E.2d 72 (W. Va. 1981).
6 Id at Syl. Pt. 6.
7 280 S.E.2d 597 (W. Va. 1981).
8 Id at Syl. Pt. 3 (alteration in original).
9 289 S.E.2d 748 (W. Va. 1982).
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judge to give a jury instruction so limiting such testimony is,
however, reversible error.10
D. Credibility of Witness
In State v. Kopa,1" Justice McHugh stated that "[t]he credibility of a
witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him and prior
cases that expound a contrary principle are hereby overruled.,
12
E. Prior Inconsistent Statement
Justice McHugh set out guidelines for using a prior inconsistent statement
of a witness in the case of State v. King.13 The court held as follows:
A videotaped interview containing a prior inconsistent statement
of a witness who claims to have been under duress when making
such statement or coerced into making such statement is
admissible into evidence if: (1) the contents thereon will assist the
jury in deciding the witness' credibility with respect to whether
the witness was under duress when making such statement or
coerced into making such statement; (2) the trial court instructs
the jury that the videotaped interview is to be considered only for
purposes of deciding the witness' credibility on the issue of duress
or coercion and not as substantive evidence; and (3) the probative
value of the videotaped interview is not outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice.14
F. Evidence of Defendant's Sexual Predilections
Justice McHugh stated in State v. Adkins 15 that "[e]vidence regarding
sexual predilections or conduct is not admissible at trial unless it is clearly
relevant."
16
10 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
11 311 S.E.2d 412 (W. Va. 1983).
12 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
13 396 S.E.2d 402 (W. Va. 1990).
14 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
15 289 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1982).
16 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
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G. Husband-Wife Communication Privilege
Justice McHugh ruled in State v. Evans17 that "[tihe privilege against
adverse spousal testimony contained in W.Va. Code, 57-3-3 [1931] applies only
where the parties stand in the relation of husband and wife."'18
H. Attorney Work Product
In State ex rel. United Hospital Center, Inc. v. Bedell,'9 Justice McHugh
addressed several matters pertaining to the attorney work doctrine. Initially he ruled
that "[t]o determine whether a document was prepared in anticipation of litigation
and, is therefore, protected from disclosure under the work product doctrine, the
primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document must have been to
assist in pending or probable future litigation." 
20
Justice McHugh concluded the opinion by stating:
When a corporation, partnership, association or governmental
agency designates an attorney to testify on its behalf at a
deposition pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure
30(b)(6), such corporation, partnership, association or
governmental agency waives the attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine with regard to matters, set forth in the
notice of deposition, about which the attorney was designated to
testify.
21
. Evidence of Juvenile Record
In State v. Van Isler,22 Justice McHugh held that "W.Va. Code, 49-5-17(d)
[1978], does not authorize a court to permit juvenile law enforcement records to be
used in a criminal case as evidence in chief in the State's case.",23 Van Isler
concluded that "[t]he use of a juvenile fingerprint card, or testimony derived from
it, as evidence in a criminal trial of the person fingerprinted after that person has
become an adult is reversible error because such use of juvenile records is not
permitted by W.Va. Code, 49-5-17 [1978]. ' '24
17 310 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1983).
18 Mdat SylPt. 5.
19 484 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1997).
20 IR. at Syl. Pt. 7.
21 Ld. at Syl. Pt 9.
22 283 S.E.2d 836 (W. Va. 1981).
23 IL at Syl. Pt. 1.
24 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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J. Use of Inadmissible Evidence to Impeach
In State v. Goodmon,25 Justice McHugh examined the use of inadmissible
evidence to impeach a defendant who testifies. Justice McHugh held that
[w]here a person who has been accused of committing a crime
makes a voluntary statement that is inadmissible as evidence in
the State's case in chief because the statement was made after the
accused had requested a lawyer, the statement may be admissible
solely for impeachment purposes when the accused takes the stand
at his trial and offers testimony contradicting the prior voluntary
statement knowing that such prior voluntary statement is
inadmissible as evidence in the State's case in chief.
26
K. Authentication of Evidence
Justice McHugh addressed issues involving authenticating evidence in the
case of State v. Jenkins. Justice McHugh stated:
Preliminary questions of authentication and identification pursuant
to W.Va.R.Evid. 901 are treated as matters of conditional
relevance, and, thus, are governed by the procedure set forth in
W.Va.R.Evid. 104(b). In an analysis under W.Va.R.Evid. 901 a
trial judge must find that the party offering the evidence has made
a prima facie showing that there is sufficient evidence "to support
a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."
In other words, the trial judge is required only to find that a
reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or
identification before the evidence is admitted. The trier of fact
determines whether the evidence is credible. Furthermore, a trial
judge's ruling on authenticity will not be disturbed on appeal
unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Lastly, a finding of
authenticity does not guarantee that the evidence is admissible
because the evidence must also be admissible under any other rule
of evidence which is applicable. 8
25 290 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1981).
26 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
27 466 S.E.2d 471 (W. Va. 1995).
28 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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L. Bite-Mark Evidence
Justice McHugh stated in State v. Armstrong29 that "[t]he general
reliability of bite-mark evidence as a means of positive identification is sufficiently
established in the field of forensic dentistry that a court is authorized to take
judicial notice of such general reliability without conducting a hearing on the
same."
30
M. Evidence of Defendant's Tattoo
Justice McHugh addressed the issue of forcing a defendant to display his
tattoos in the case of State v. Meade.3' The court held as follows:
Ordinarily, it is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court in a
criminal case to direct the accused to reveal or display the
accused's tattoos to a witness and to the jury at trial, where the
accused's tattoos are relevant to the question of the identification
of the perpetrator of the offense and where the trial court has
weighed the probative value of such evidence against the danger
of unfair prejudice, etc., pursuant to Rules 401, 402, and 403 of the
West Virginia Rules of Evidence.32
N. Evidence of Other Crimes
The decision in State v. CaudillP held that "[e]vidence relating to a crime
that a defendant is accused of committing, other than that charged in the indictment
for which he is on trial, is not generally admissible to prove the offense for which
the accused is on trial."34
0. Confession
Justice McHugh relied upon State v. Starras in holding in State v. Mitter 6
that "[t]he State must prove, at least by a preponderance of the evidence, that
confessions or statements of an accused which amount to admissions of part or all
29 369 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1988).
30 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
31 474 S.E.2d 481 (W. Va. 1996).
32 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
33 289 S.E.2d 748 (W. Va. 1982).
4 la at Syl. Pt. 1.
35 216 S.E.2d 242 (W. Va. 1975).
36 289 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va. 1982).
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of an offense were voluntary before such may be admitted into the evidence of a
criminal case.",
37
Justice McHugh said in State v. Adkins? that "[a] witness at a criminal
trial may testify that he, the witness, and not the defendant was responsible for the
crime for which the defendant is on trial.'39
P. Noninculpatory Statements by Defendant
Justice McHugh stated in State v. McFarland40 that "[a] noninculpatory
statement made spontaneously by a criminal defendant in response to the greeting
or salutation of a law enforcement officer does not result from an 'interrogation'
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966),
and such a spontaneous statement is admissible without an in camera hearing on its
voluntariness.
41
Q. Evidence Precluded by the Dead Man's Statute
In Papenhaus v. Combs,42 Justice McHugh held that "[a] witness who is
not a party to an action or has no interest in that action, is not precluded by W. Va.
Code, 57-3-1 [1937], commonly referred to as the 'Dead Man's Statute,' from
testifying with regard to a personal transaction or communication between such
witness and a decedent.,
43
Justice McHugh addressed several issues involving the Dead Man's
Statute in Cross v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.' He held:
[t]he testimony of a witness which is adverse to the interests of
insurance beneficiaries in a declaratory judgment action brought
on their behalf by the personal representative of the deceased
insured against the insurer is testimony which is "against the
executor [or] administrator," within the meaning of the Dead
Man's Statute, W.Va. Code, 57-3-1 [1937]. 45
Justice McHugh held that "[a] witness' status as an agent of a party,
37 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
38 289 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1982).
39 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
40 332 S.E.2d 217 (W. Va. 1985).
41 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.
42 292 S.E.2d 621 (W. Va. 1982).
43 Id. at Syl. PL 1.
4 387 S.E.2d 556 (W. Va. 1989).
45 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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without more, does not make him or her a 'person interested,' within the meaning
of W.Va. Code, 57-3-1 [1937], and his or her testimony is not on that basis
precluded by that statute.",
46
The court concluded by stating that
[t]he Dead Man's Statute, W.Va. Code, 57-3-1 [1937], does not
bar the testimony of an insurer's agents that they orally informed
the decedent of the costs of various levels of uninsured motorist
coverage, where the only assertion is that the insurer's agents are
incompetent witnesses by virtue of their interests as agents. 47
In Voelker v. Frederick Business Properties Co.,48 Justice McHugh held:
Evidence of a beneficiary's relationship with the decedent may be
admitted into evidence for purposes of determining damages in a
wrongful death action pursuant to W.Va. Code, 55-7-6(c)(1)
[1989] which provides for the recovery of damages for "[s]orrow,
mental anguish, and solace which may include society,
companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of
the decedent[.]" Whether evidence is relevant pursuant to
W.Va.R.Evid. 401 and 402 when determining damages in a
wrongful death action and whether the probative value of such
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice pursuant to W.Va.R.Evid. 403 must be determined on a
case-by-case basis. Moreover, on appeal this Court will not
disturb a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of such evidence
unless there has been an abuse of discretion.49
R. Out-of-Court Identification of Defendant
In State v. Gravely,50 Justice McHugh confronted the issue of admitting
out-of-court identification evidence. The court held:
An adversary judicial criminal proceeding is instituted against a
defendant where the defendant after his arrest is taken before a
magistrate pursuant to W.Va. Code, 62-1-5 [1965], and is, inter
alia, informed pursuant to W.Va. Code, 62-1-6 [1965], of the
complaint against him and of his right to counsel. Furthermore,
46 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
47 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
48 465 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1995).
49 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
so 299 S.E.2d 375 (W. Va. 1982).
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where the defendant at that magistrate proceeding expresses a
desire to be represented by counsel, a subsequent pretrial
identification of the defendant at a police initiated line-up or
one-on-one police initiated confrontation between the defendant
and a witness or crime victim, without notice to and in the absence
of defense counsel, constitutes a violation of the defendant's right
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and under art. III, Sec. 14, of the Constitution of
West Virginia, so as to preclude any trial testimony in regard to
the identification procedure.51
S. In-Court Identification of Defendant
Justice McHugh relied upon State v. Pratt52 to hold in State v. Baker that
"[a] defendant must be allowed an in camera hearing on the admissibility of a
pending in-court identification when he challenges it because the witness was a
party to pre-trial identification procedures that were allegedly constitutionally
infrm.54
T. Out-of-Court Experiment
Justice McHugh ruled in State v. Kopa55 that
[t]he results of an out-of-court experiment will not be admitted
into evidence unless the party seeking to introduce such evidence
demonstrates that the conditions under which the experiment was
conducted were substantially similar to the original conditions
sought to be recreated and the question of whether to admit such
evidence for consideration by the jury is within the sound
discretion of the trial court.56
U. Gruesome Photographs
The admission of gruesome photographs was addressed by Justice
McHugh in State v. Clark.57 The court held:
51 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
52 244 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1978).
53 287 S.E.2d 497 (W. Va. 1982).
54 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
55 311 S.E.2d 412 (W. Va. 1983).
56 Id. at Syl. Pt 5.
57 292 S.E.2d 643 (W. Va. 1982).
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Where several gruesome photographs are admitted in evidence
with an objection being made only to the least gruesome of such
photographs, and where defense counsel during closing argument
specifically calls the jury's attention to the other gruesome
photographs, which photographs were not objected to when
admitted in evidence, this Court will not find the admission of the
least gruesome photograph reversible error on the ground of
prejudice. 8
V. Victim Character Evidence
Justice McHugh stated in State v. Dietz:
59
It is proper for a trial court to exclude testimony relating to the
reputation for aggressiveness and character for violence of the
victim in a homicide case where the defendant claims reasonable
apprehension of danger, but where the defendant had no prior
knowledge of such reputation at the time of the homicide.60
Justice McHugh indicated in Dietz v. Legursky61 that
[i]n a homicide case, malicious wounding, or assault where the
defendant relies on self-defense or provocation, under Rule
404(a)(2) and Rule 405(a) of the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence, character evidence in the form of opinion testimony
may be admitted to show that the victim was the aggressor if the
probative value of such evidence is not outweighed by the
concerns set forth in the balancing test of Rule 403.62
W. Witness Character Evidence
Justice McHugh addressed conditions under which a witness's character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness may be presented in the case of State v. Wood.63
In that opinion he held as follows:
West Virginia Rules of Evidence 608(a) permits the admission of
evidence in the form of an opinion or reputation regarding a
58 Id at Syl. Pt. 3.
59 390 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1990).
60 Id at Syl. Pt. 6.
61 425 S.E.2d 202 (W. Va. 1992).
62 Id at Syl. Pt. 3.
63 460 S.E.2d 771 (W. Va. 1995).
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witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, subject to
two limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness; and (2) evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the witness for
truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence
or otherwise. The admission of testimony pursuant to
W.Va.R.Evid. 608(a) is within the sound discretion of the trial
judge and is subject to W.Va.R.Evid. 402, which requires the
evidence to be relevant; W.Va.R.Evid. 403, which requires the
exclusion of evidence whose "probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury[J;]" and W.Va.R.Evid. 611, which
requires the court to protect witnesses from harassment and undue
embarrassment.64
X. Victim Testimony
Justice McHugh held in State v. Hal6 5 that "[normally the owner of
stolen property may testify as to its value because he is deemed qualified to give an
opinion concerning the value of the things which he owns."
66
Y. Testimony in Narrative Form
Justice McHugh opined in State v. Armstrong67 that "[t]he trial court is
vested with sound discretion to permit a witness to testify in narrative form, rather
than by question and answer." 
68
Z. Hearsay
Justice McHugh indicated in Hess v. Arbogast69 that "[i]n order for
hearsay to be admissible evidence, it must first be either excepted or exempted
from the general bar from admissibility contained in Rule 802. Second, it must
meet the general requirements for admissibility, authenticity, relevancy, and
competency." 70 Hess also noted that "[u]nder W.Va.R.Evid. 803(8)(C), the
contents of a public report, record or document are an exception to the hearsay rule
and are assumed to be trustworthy, unless the opponent of the report establishes
64 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
65 298 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1982).
66 Id. at Syl. PL 5.
67 369 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1988).
68 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
69 376 S.E.2d 333 (W. Va. 1988).
70 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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that the report is sufficiently untrustworthy.
71
In Heydinger v. Adkins,72 Justice McHugh held that "[a] statement is not
hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is his [or her] own statement,
in either his [or her] individual or a representative capacity."73 The opinion also
indicated that "[w]here a party, after having submitted to a polygraph examination,
makes any statement constituting an admission against interest, such testimony is
admissible at trial pursuant to W.Va.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), provided that the
admission was not procured by coercive conduct or a denial of the party's
constitutional rights."74
Justice McHugh held in Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Co. v.
Burke7s that
[w]here the formal designation of the beneficiary(ies) of a life
insurance policy or of other death benefits is ambiguous in light of
the circumstances at the time of such designation, a declaration of
the insured as to whom he or she intended to be the
beneficiary(ies) is admissible as evidence of such intent under the
exception to the hearsay rule for declarations of intent,
W.Va.R.Evid. 803(3).76
Justice McHugh held in Rine By & Through Rine v. Irisari7 that "[a]s a
condition precedent to the admissibility of former testimony under W.Va.R.Evid.
804(b)(1), the proponent of such testimony must show the unavailability of the
witness. If the witness is available, the in-court testimony of that witness is
preferred.
78
The case of State v. Satterfield9 presented Justice McHugh with an
opportunity to discuss the dying declaration exception to hearsay. The court held
initially that
[a] suicide note may be admissible pursuant to W.Va.R.Evid.
804(b)(2) as a dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. In
order for a statement found in a suicide note to be admissible as a
71 Ld. at Syl. Pt. 4.
72 360 S.E.2d 240 (W. Va. 1987).
73 Id. at Syl. Pt. I (alterations in original).
74 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
75 368 S.E.2d 301 (W. Va. 1988).
76 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
77 420 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1992).
78 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
79 457 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1995).
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dying declaration the following must occur: the statement must
have been made when the declarant was under the belief that his
death was imminent, and the dying declaration must concern the
cause or circumstances of what the declarant believes to be his
impending death. 80
Satterfield next held:
Once a trial judge determines that a statement falls within the
dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule found in
W.Va.R.Evid. 804(b)(2), then it must be determined whether the
evidence is relevant pursuant to W.Va.R.Evid. 401 and 402 and, if
so, whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by
unfair prejudice pursuant to W.Va.R.Evid. 403. The statement is
admissible only after the trial judge determines that its probative
value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.81
AA. Demonstrative Evidence
In State v. Hardway,8 2 Justice McHugh considered the propriety of the
prosecutor recreating a crime scene. The court held:
It is not error for a trial court, in a homicide case, to allow the
State to conduct a demonstration in the presence of the jury which
re-creates the scene of the homicide by arranging articles in
substantially the same position as they were at the time of the
homicide, if the demonstration allows the jury to more
intelligently consider the State's theory of the case or to rebut the
defendant's theory of the case and if the probative value of such
demonstration is not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.83
Justice McHugh noted in State v. Kernsa4 that "[g]enerally, the
admissibility of demonstrative evidence is a matter within the discretion of the trial
court."
8 5
80 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
81 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
82 385 S.E.2d 62 (W. Va. 1989).
B3 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.
84 420 S.E.2d 891 (W. Va. 1992).
85 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
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BB. Expert Testimony
Justice McHugh stated in State v. Dietz86 that
[i]n a homicide case a medical examiner may be qualified to state
an opinion as to whether the homicide was of a psychosexual type.
Such qualification should be based upon the medical examiner's:
post-mortem examination or a review of the report thereof;
knowledge of psychosexual types of homicide; and experience in
post-mortem examinations upon similarly situated victims.
Whether a medical examiner is qualified in this regard is a
determination to be made by the trial court, and, unless the trial
court has abused its discretion, this Court will not disturb the trial
court's ruling.8'
Justice McHugh held in Gilman v. Choim that "W.Va. Code, 55-7B-7
[1986], being concerned primarily with the competency of expert testimony in a
medical malpractice action, is valid under Rule 601 of the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence." 89
In Teter v. Old Colony Co.,90 Justice McHugh's opinion stated "W.Va.
Code, 37-14-1, et seq., is not designed to prevent an expert otherwise qualified
under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence from testifying with regard
to the value of real property or the damages that may have resulted to it."
91
In Mayhorn v. Logan Medical Foundation,92 Justice McHugh wrote:
Rule 703 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence allows an expert
to base his opinion on (1) personal observations; (2) facts or data,
admissible in evidence, and presented to the expert at or before
trial; and (3) information otherwise inadmissible in evidence, if
this type of information is reasonably relied upon by experts in the
witness' field.93
The court in Mayhorn next held:
85 390 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1990).
87 /d at Syl. Pt. 4.
88 406 S.E.2d 200 (W. Va. 1990).
89 Id at Syl..
s0 441 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1994).
91 Id at Syl. Pt. 8.
92 454 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va. 1994).
93 Id at Syl. Pt. 2.
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Pursuant to West Virginia Rules of Evidence 702 an expert's
opinion is admissible if the basic methodology employed by the
expert in arriving at his opinion is scientifically or technically
valid and properly applied. The jury, and not the trial judge,
determines the weight to be given to the expert's opinion.94
The court concluded:
Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence is the paramount
authority for determining whether or not an expert is qualified to
give an opinion. Therefore, to the extent that Gilman v. Choi, 185
W. Va. 177, 406 S.E.2d 200 (1990) indicates that the legislature
may by statute determine when an expert is qualified to state an
opinion, it is overruled.95
CC. Rebuttal
In Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical Center,96 Justice McHugh stated:
Under Rule 611 (a) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, a trial
court has broad discretion in permitting or excluding the
admission of rebuttal testimony, and this Court will not disturb the
ruling of a trial court on the admissibility of rebuttal evidence
unless there has been an abuse of discretion.
97
In State v. Dietz,98 Justice McHugh stated that "[w]here a criminal
defendant's witness on direct examination raises a material matter, and on
cross-examination testifies adversely to the prosecution, it is proper for the trial
court to allow the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence as to such matter." 99
DD. Leading Questions
In the case of Rine By & Through Rine v. Irisari,°° Justice McHugh stated
that "[w]here the adverse party or a witness favorable to the adverse party is called
as a witness by the opponent, leading questions by the adverse party's own counsel
94 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
95 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
96 422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1992).
97 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
98 390 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1990).
99 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
100 420 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1992).
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on cross-examination will usually not be allowed." 10 1
EE. Meaning of Materiality
In State v. Kerns,10 2 Justice McHugh ruled that "[t]he evidence is material
only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable
probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
103
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Defendant's Presence at All Critical Stages
Justice McHugh ruled in State ex rel. Redman v. Hedrick'04 that "[i]n a
criminal proceeding, the defendant's absence at a critical stage of such proceeding
is not reversible error where no possibility of prejudice to the defendant occurs."' 05
B. Continuance
The case of State ex rel. Shorter v. Hey'06 called upon the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals to revisit its precedent concerning continuances in
criminal cases. Justice McHugh noted that the court's precedent was inconsistent
with fairness, and in doing so, he held that "[syllabus points] 1 and 2 in State ex
rel. Holstein v. Casey, 164 W. Va. 460, 265 S.E.2d 530 (1980) are hereby overruled
to the extent the same are in conflict with this opinion."' 10 7
The court in Hey then went on to establish new law in the area of
continuances in criminal cases. Justice McHugh held as an initial matter that
[t]he determination of what is good cause, pursuant to W.Va.
Code, 62-3-1, for a continuance of a trial beyond the term of
indictment is in the sound discretion of the trial court, and when
good cause is determined a trial court may, pursuant to W.Va.
Code, 62-3-1, grant a continuance of a trial beyond the term of
indictment at the request of either the prosecutor or defense, or
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